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Civilian Statutes and Judicial Discretion 
Symeon C. Symeonides* 
INTRODUCTION: THE PERENNIAL TENSION AND THE 
QUEST FOR AN EQUILIBRIUM 
René David, the famous French comparatist, once said that “[t]here is 
and will always be in all countries a contradiction between two 
requirements of justice: the law must be certain and predictable on one 
hand, it must be flexible and adaptable to circumstances on the other 
hand.”1  
Indeed, the tension between the need for legal certainty and 
predictability on the one hand, and the need for flexible, equitable, and 
individualized solutions on the other is as old as law itself. Aristotle 
described this tension more than 23 centuries ago when he spoke of the 
role of equity as a necessary corrective of positive law.2 Twenty centuries 
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 1. RENÉ DAVID, ENGLISH LAW AND FRENCH LAW 24 (1980). 
 2. See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, at 4-7, in 2 The Ethics 
of Aristotle 140–41 (Alexander Grant ed., Longmans, Green & Co. 2d rev. ed. 
1866) (c. 384 B.C.E.) (“[T]he law always speaks in general terms, yet in many 
cases it is impossible to speak in terms that are both general and correct at the 
same time. In those cases, then, in which it is necessary to speak in general terms 
but not possible to do so correctly, the law provides for the majority of cases, with 
full awareness of the deficiency of its provisions. Thus, when the law pronounces 
a general rule and thereafter a case arises that is not covered by the general rule, 
then it is proper, where the legislator’s pronouncement is defective because of its 
over-simplicity, to rectify the defect by deciding in the same way as the legislator 
would have decided . . . had he been cognizant of the case. . . . This is in essence 
the nature of the equitable (epieikes): A corrective of the law when law is defective 
due to its generality. In fact, this is why it is impossible to legislate about certain 
matters and why it becomes necessary to address them through [ad hoc] 
Resolutions. Undefinable matters cannot be regulated by definite rules.” 
(Author’s translation)). Unless otherwise noted, all translations are the Author’s. 
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later, two French legal philosophers took opposing positions. Rousseau 
spoke of the legislator’s inability to foresee changing circumstances, 
noting that “[a] thousand cases against which the legislator has made no 
provision may present themselves.”3 In contrast, Montesquieu thought that 
judges should be no more than “the mouth that pronounces the words of 
the law, inanimate beings who can moderate neither its force nor its 
rigor.”4 Although speaking in a different context, Voltaire apparently 
agreed with Rousseau when he wrote the inimitable: “Uncertainty is an 
uncomfortable position, but certainty is an absurd one.”5 
The common assumption is that civil law systems aim for certainty, 
but common law systems aim for flexibility. Although this Essay is limited 
to civil law systems, both systems face the same tension between these 
two competing yet necessary goals, and both strive for the optimum 
equilibrium in light of their own needs and values. Naturally, this 
equilibrium differs not only from system to system, but also from subject 
to subject and from time to time. What may be the “right” equilibrium for 
one subject or period is not necessarily so for another. Thus, the quest for 
the golden mean is universal and perpetual.  
This quest surfaces at several junctures in the architecture, 
methodology, and operation of a legal system, including: (1) its statutory 
design, (2) the degree of discretion the legal system allows judges, and (3) 
more generally, the reciprocal relationship between the legislature and the 
judiciary.  
The Code Napoléon provides an early example of the legislature’s 
ambivalence toward the judiciary. Article 5 provides that “[j]udges are 
forbidden to pronounce decisions by way of general and regulative 
                                                                                                             
In sources published in non-western languages, the English translation is from a 
translation into another western language. 
 3. See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT OR PRINCIPLES OF 
POLITICAL RIGHT bk. IV, ch. VI, at 98–99 (G.D.H. Cole trans., J.M. Dent & Sons 
1923) (1762) (“The inflexibility of the laws, which prevents them from adapting 
themselves to circumstances, may, in certain cases, render them disastrous . . The 
order and slowness of the forms they enjoin require a space of time which 
circumstances sometimes withhold. A thousand cases against which the legislator 
has made no provision may present themselves, and it is a highly necessary part 
of foresight to be conscious that everything cannot be foreseen.”).  
 4. 1 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 163 (Anne M. Cohler et al. 
eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748). 
 5. Letter from Voltaire to Frederick II of Prussia (Nov. 28, 1770), in 12 
OEUVRES COMPLÈTES DE VOLTAIRE 703 (1817). The phrase quoted in the text is 
the most common translation of Voltaire’s phrase “Le doute n’est pas une 
condition agréable, mais la certitude est absurde.” 
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dispositions on causes which are submitted to them.”6 Echoing 
Montesquieu’s prescription, this article reflects the political realities of the 
pre-revolutionary period, which was marked by the abuses of the ancien 
regime’s courts—the infamous Parlements. Article 5 was intended to 
ensure that the unelected judges would not directly or indirectly engage in 
judicial lawmaking through their jurisprudence. The Code, however, also 
provides in Article 4 that “[t]he judge who refuses to judge, under pretext 
of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law, may be subject to 
prosecution for denial of justice.”7 Article 4 is susceptible to different 
interpretations, including one to the effect that—like Article 5—the 
drafters directed the article against a specific pre-revolution judicial 
practice. The better view, however, is that Article 4, far from proclaiming 
that the Code is gapless, recognizes the existence of lacunae and requires 
the judge to fill them through deduction from the Code’s general principles 
and reasoning by analogy.  
In this sense, Article 4 points away from Montesquieu’s vision of a 
passive judiciary and toward Rousseau’s pragmatic understanding of the 
legislature’s predictive abilities. Apparently, the Code’s drafters shared 
this understanding when they wrote that for the legislateur “to anticipate 
everything is a goal impossible of attainment.”8 Consequently, the 
legislator’s role is “to set, by taking a broad approach, the general 
propositions of the law, [and] to establish principles which will be fertile 
in application. . . . It is for the judge and the jurist, imbued with the general 
spirit of the laws to direct their application.”9 
In the intervening centuries, the French judiciary gradually and 
creatively asserted itself and has assumed a much more important role in 
shaping French law than Article 4 contemplated. Today, the jurisprudence 
of the Cour de Cassation is much more important than the Code’s drafters 
envisioned. Most French judges do not consider themselves as the mere 
                                                                                                             
 6. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 5 (1804) (Fr.) (Author’s translation). 
 7. Id. art. 4.  
 8. Portalis et al., Texte du discours préliminaire, in 1 LOCRÉ, LA 
LÉGISLATION CIVILE, COMMERCIALE ET CRIMINELLE DE LA FRANCE, 251, 255 
(1827) (Author’s translation). 
 9. Id. (Author’s translation). 
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mouthpieces of the legislature,10 even if they continue pretending to write 
in that fashion.11  
In the meantime, the establishment and growth of the European Court 
of Justice and its increasingly expanding role in shaping European Union 
law has dramatically transformed the continental legal landscape by 
altering the previously established hierarchy of sources of law and 
elevating the role of judicial precedent.12 Thus, the question today is no 
longer whether judges may act to fill statutory lacunae, but rather whether 
and to what extent judges may deviate from the statutory text.  
This Essay discusses this question in a limited context by examining 
recent statutes in which the legislature itself authorizes such a deviation. 
The context is further limited to one particular legal field, which happens 
to be the Author’s specialty—private international law (“PIL”) or conflict 
of laws—and more specifically, the Essay focuses on PIL codifications 
enacted in the last 50 years. Part I enumerates the various grants of 
legislatively authorized discretion in these codifications. Part II then 
focuses on the most explicit of those grants—“escape clauses.” The Essay 
concludes by attempting to draw some conclusions about the evolving 
relationship between legislators and judges and the modern art and science 
of codification.  
                                                                                                             
 10. For an excellent portrayal of the actual role played today by the French 
judiciary in the French legal system, see Mitchel de S.-O.-I’E. Lasser, Judicial 
(Self-) Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the French Legal System, 104 YALE L.J. 
1325 (1995); see also JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 263–431 
(1968); ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN & JAMES RUSSELL GORDLEY, THE CIVIL 
LAW SYSTEM 97–126, 215–45, 1127–60 (2d ed. 1977); Vincy Fon & Francesco 
Parisi, Judicial Precedents in Civil Law Systems: A Dynamic Analysis, 26 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 519 (2006). 
 11. As one contemporary French judge put it, “[t]he American judge is 
somehow expected to judge, really to judge. In France, the Code is supposed to 
have already judged.” Lasser, supra note 10, at 1326 (quoting Interview with 
Jean-Frangois Lyotard, Council Member at the Collège Int’l de Philosophic, in 
New Haven, Conn. (Jan. 1992)). 
 12. For discussion of the role of this Court in EU law, see MARC JACOB, 
PRECEDENTS AND CASE-BASED REASONING IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
JUSTICE: UNFINISHED BUSINESS (2014); THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE: ANALYSES AND PERSPECTIVES ON SIXTY YEARS OF 
CASE-LAW (Allan Rosas, Egils Levits & Yves Bot eds., 2013); JUDICIAL 
ACTIVISM AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE (Mark Dawson, Bruno De Witte 
& Elise Muir eds., 2013); JUDGING EUROPE’S JUDGES: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE 
CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE (Maurice Adams et al. eds., 
2013); ELINA PAUNIO, LEGAL CERTAINTY IN MULTILINGUAL EU LAW (2013). 
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I. LEGISLATIVELY AUTHORIZED JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
During the last 50 years, we have witnessed an unprecedented degree 
of legislative activity in PIL: the enactment of 94 PIL codifications or re-
codifications, in 84 countries on all continents. These codifications are 
discussed in detail in another publication.13 The vast majority of them 
exhibit a non-antagonistic relationship between the legislature and the 
judiciary, evidenced by several express legislative grants of discretion to 
judges. These grants appear in several shapes and forms, including the 
following:  
(1) [T]he use of escape clauses authorizing courts to deviate from 
the codification’s choice-of-law rules in appropriate circumstances; 
(2) the use (either in choice-of-law rules or in escapes clauses) of 
composite or “soft” connecting factors, such as the “closest 
connection” or “strongest connection,” namely, factors that do not 
depend on the location of a single contact but rather on multiple 
factors and circumstances to be evaluated by the court in the light 
of each particular case;14 or  
(3) the use of malleable “approaches” or similar formulae that do 
not directly designate the applicable law, but instead provide a list 
of factors the court must consider in choosing that law. In some 
codifications, these formulae are followed by presumptive rules 
designating the ordinarily applicable law in specified situations, 
while in other codifications the formulae play a residual role for 
cases not covered by specific choice-of-law rules.15 
Because of the space limitations of this Review, this Essay discusses 
only the first of these grants, the legislatively authorized judicial escapes. 
Before doing so, however, providing a brief explanation of choice-of-law 
rules and their component parts may be useful for readers unfamiliar with 
PIL.  
                                                                                                             
 13. See SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CODIFYING CHOICE OF LAW AROUND THE 
WORLD: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (2014) [hereinafter 
SYMEONIDES, CODIFYING CHOICE OF LAW].  
 14. See id. at 176–89.  
 15. See id. at 204–08. The Louisiana and Oregon codifications, both drafted 
by this Author, employ such an approach but combined with rules. For discussion 
of this combination, see Symeon C. Symeonides, The Conflicts Book of the 
Louisiana Civil Code: Civilian, American, or Original?, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1041, 
1049–58, 1065–66 (2009); Symeon C. Symeonides, Oregon’s New Choice-of-
Law Codification for Tort Conflicts: An Exegesis, 88 OR. L. REV. 963, 1032–44 
(2009). 
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A choice-of-law rule is one that designates the state whose law will 
govern a case that has pertinent contacts with more than one state. A 
typical choice-of-law rule points to the state that has a certain connection 
with the case, such as the place of the tort, the conclusion of a contract, or 
the domicile of the parties. This connection is referred to as a “connecting 
factor.” One of the most ubiquitous connecting factors in recent PIL 
codifications is the “closest connection.” Rather than a priori designating 
the state of the applicable law, these codifications authorize courts to 
consider all pertinent contacts and factors, and identify the state of the 
“closest connection” on a case-by-case basis.16  
II. ESCAPE CLAUSES 
As Aristotle recognized so many centuries ago, any pre-formulated 
rule—no matter how carefully or wisely drafted—may, “due to its 
generality” or because of its specificity, produce results contrary to the 
purpose for which the rule was designed.17 In the words of Peter Hay, this 
outcome “is a natural consequence of the difference between law making 
and law application.”18 
With some notable exceptions,19 most modern legislatures seem fully 
aware of the inherent limitations in their ability to anticipate everything. 
In recent years, those who have codified choice-of-law provisions have 
recognized these limitations and have taken the previously unprecedented 
step of expressly granting judges the authority to adjust—or avoid 
altogether—the application of a rule when the circumstances of the 
individual case so dictate. In addition to traditional escapes, such as ordre 
public (public policy exception) or fraude à la loi (evasion of law), this 
grant of authority takes the form of escape clauses attached to the rules.  
Escape clauses can be divided into two categories: (1) general escapes, 
which generally apply to all (or most) choice-of-law rules in a 
comprehensive choice-of-law codification;20 and (2) specific escapes, 
which generally are attached to a particular choice-of-law rule, or small 
group of rules, so as to provide an exception to that rule or rules.21 
                                                                                                             
 16. For detailed discussion of the role of the closest connection in recent PIL 
codifications, see SYMEONIDES, CODIFYING CHOICE OF Law, supra note 13, 176–
88. 
 17. ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 140–41. 
 18. Peter Hay, Flexibility Versus Predictability and Uniformity in Choice of 
Law, 226 RECUEIL DES COURS 281, 291 (1991). 
 19. See, e.g., CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] arts. 8–12 (Spain). 
 20. See infra Part II.A. 
 21. See infra Part II.B. 
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Although most of these escapes are based on the principle of the “closer 
connection,” some of them are based on other factors.22  
A. General Escapes  
Article 15 of the Swiss Federal Act on Private International Law is 
one of the oldest examples of a general escape, and is perhaps the clearest. 
The article provides that the law that any of the codification’s rules 
designate as applicable is “by way of exception” not to be applied if, “from 
the totality of the circumstances, it is manifest that the particular case has 
only a very slight connection to that law and has a much closer relationship 
to another law.”23 This escape has served as a model for similar escapes in 
some other PIL codifications. 
Article 19 of the Belgian Code of Private International Law contains 
a two-pronged escape.24 That article provides that the law that the 
codification designates as applicable should not be applied if “it manifestly 
appears from the totality of the circumstances” that the matter has “only a 
very slight connection” with the state of the designated law but is “very 
closely connected” to another state.25 In that case, the law of the latter state 
governs.26 The article also provides guidance for the judicial deployment 
of the escape. In applying this escape, the court should give due 
consideration to “the need of predictability of the applicable law” and “the 
circumstance that the relevant legal relationship was validly established in 
accordance with the private international law of the States with which the 
legal relationship was connected when it was created.”27  
In a similar vein, Article 8 of Book 10 of the Dutch Civil Code 
provides a general exception from Dutch statutory choice-of-law rules 
based on the presumption of a “close connection.” The exception provides 
that the law which that type of rule designates as applicable must 
“exceptionally” not be applied “if, given all circumstances, the presumed 
close connection hardly exists and there exists a much closer connection 
to another law.”28 Similar general escapes, with slight variations in 
                                                                                                             
 22. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 23. BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DAS INTENATIONALE PRIVATRECHT [IPRG], LOI 
FÉDERALE SUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ [LDIP] [FEDERAL CODE ON 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (CPIL)] Dec. 18, 1987, art. 15 (Switz.) (Author’s 
Translation). 
 24. CODE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ [C.INT.PRIV.] art. 19 (Belg.). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. art. 19(2) (Author’s translation).  
 28. BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [BW] bk. 10, art. 8 (Neth.) (Author’s translation).  
1132 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76 
 
 
 
phraseology, exist in other codifications, including those of Argentina, the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (“FYROM”), South Korea, 
Lithuania, Quebec, Serbia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.29 
Article 1 of the Austrian codification provides a subtler escape, at least 
potentially. The first paragraph states the operating principle of the entire 
codification by providing that “[f]actual situations with foreign contacts 
shall be judged . . . according to the legal order to which the strongest 
connection exists.”30 The second paragraph provides that the 
codification’s choice-of-law rules “shall be considered as expressions of 
this principle.”31 This paragraph can be interpreted in two different ways. 
The first interpretation is that this provision is no more than a gap-filler to 
only be employed only in cases for which the codification does not 
designate the applicable law.32 The second and more logical interpretation 
is that this provision is a genuine—albeit oblique—general escape from 
all of the codification’s rules. This general escape would authorize the 
court to deviate from a particular rule if the court determines that, in the 
circumstances of a particular case, the rule would lead to a result that is 
inconsistent with the general principle of the strongest connection. 
Austrian court decisions support both of these interpretations.33 
Article 2 of the Bulgarian Private International Law Code is similar 
but arguably more capable of functioning as a general escape. Paragraph 
1 of the article provides that the law of the state that has the closest 
connection with the legal relation at stake governs the multistate 
relationships, and that the codification’s choice-of-law rules “express this 
principle.”34 Paragraph 2 then states that, if one cannot determine the 
                                                                                                             
 29. For citations and discussion, see SYMEONIDES, CODIFYING CHOICE OF 
Law, supra note 13, at 192–94. 
 30. BUNDESGESETZ VOM 15. JUNI 1978 ÜBER DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT 
[IPR-GESETZ] [FEDERAL STATUTE OF 1978 ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW] 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] No. 304/1978, § 1 (Austria) (Author’s translation). 
 31. Id.  
 32. Other codifications contain provisions that function as gap-fillers. For 
example, Article 26 of the Tunisian codification provides that if the codification 
does not provide a rule for a particular situation, the judge will designate the 
applicable law by an objective determination of the connecting factor relevant to 
the legal category. CODE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ [C.D.I.P.] [CODE OF 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW] art. 26 (Tunis.). Article 1253(2) of the Armenian 
Civil Code provides that if the codification does not provide a choice-of-law rule 
for a particular subject, the court should apply “the law most closely connected” 
with that subject. ARM. CIVIL CODE art. 1253(2). 
 33. See SYMEONIDES, CODIFYING CHOICE OF Law, supra note 13, at 194 & 
n.144. 
 34. BULG. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW CODE art. 2(1). 
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governing law through those rules, “the law of the State with which the 
relationship has the closest connection by virtue of other criteria shall 
apply.”35 The fact that Paragraph 2 expressly addresses the gap-filling 
function of the closest-connection principle would render the reference to 
the same principle in Paragraph 1 superfluous, unless that reference was 
intended to serve as an authorization for an escape when the state 
designated by a choice-of-law rule turns out not to have the closest 
connection in the particular case. 
Article 2 of the Chinese PIL codification and Article 1003 of the 
Burkina Faso Code of Persons and Family36 have the same capacity to 
function as general escapes. The Chinese article provides that the law 
governing a multistate civil relationship “shall have the closest 
connection” with such relationship, and if the codification does not 
provide for a particular relationship, “the law of the country that has the 
closest connection with [that] relationship . . . shall be applied.”37  
B. Specific Escapes 
Specific escapes, which are escapes that qualify fewer than all of the 
choice-of-law rules of a particular codification, are much more numerous 
than general escapes. This fact is not surprising; after all, the need for legal 
certainty varies from one area of the law to another. For this reason, the 
adoption of escape clauses encounters less resistance in some areas of the 
law, such as torts, than in other areas, such as property, thus making the 
adoption of specific escapes more palatable to legislators who are less 
trusting of judges. 
1. Escapes Based on the “Closer Connection” 
The majority of specific escape clauses are unsurprisingly based on 
the principle of the “closer connection” (“proximity principle”) because 
                                                                                                             
 35. Id. art. 2(2). 
 36. Article 1003 of the Burkina Faso codification provides that multistate 
legal relationships are governed by the law that has the “strongest connection” 
and that the codification’s choice-of-law rules are “considered as the expression 
of [this] general principle.” CODE DES PERSONNES ET DE LA FAMILLE [CODE OF 
PERSONS AND FAMILY] art. 1003 (Burk. Faso). The same article also provides that, 
in case of gap or insufficiency in those rules, the judge should be “inspired” by, 
and draw from, this principle. Id. 
 37. Law of the Application of Law for Foreign-Related Civil Relations 
(adopted at the 17th session of the Standing Committee of the 11th National 
People’s Congress on October 28, 2010), art. 2 (2011) (China). 
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most of the escapes accompany choice-of-law rules that themselves are based 
on the principle of closest connection. The typical escape provides that, if the 
state whose law is designated as applicable by a particular choice-of-law rule, 
based on the closest connection, turns out to have an attenuated connection, 
and another state has a manifestly much closer connection, the law of the latter 
state shall govern.  
Escape clauses based on this principle can be found in the Rome 
Convention and now the Rome I Regulation for contracts, and the Rome II 
Regulation for torts. Article 4(5) of the Rome Convention provided that the 
presumptive rules of that article “shall be disregarded if it appears from the 
circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected” with a 
country other than the country designated by those rules.38 Article 4(3) of 
Rome I contains the same escape in slightly tighter language.39 That article 
provides that if it is “clear from all the circumstances of the case” that a 
contract that does not contain a choice-of-law clause is “manifestly more 
closely connected” with a country other than that indicated by the preceding 
paragraphs of that article, the law of that other country shall apply.40 
Rome II contains similar escapes in its general rule of Article 4,41 as well 
as in the articles dealing with products liability,42 unfair competition cases in 
which the competition exclusively affects the interests of a specific 
competitor,43 unjust enrichment,44 negotiorum gestio,45 and culpa in 
contrahendo.46 The escapes provide that, if it is “clear from all the 
circumstances of the case” that the tort is “manifestly more closely connected” 
                                                                                                             
 38. Convention 80/934, on the Laws Applicable to Conventional Obligations, 
art. 4(5), 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1, 3 (EC). Also, article 6(2) provided that, in the 
absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, employment contracts in 
which the employee does not habitually carry out his work in any one country are 
to be governed by the law of the country in which the place of business through 
which he was engaged is situated, “unless it appears from the circumstances as a 
whole that the contract is more closely connected with another country, in which 
case the contract shall be governed by the law of that country.” Id. art. 6(2). 
 39. Regulation 593/2008, on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 
(Rome I), art. 4(3), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6, 11. 
 40. Id. A similar escape is found in articles 5(3) (contracts of carriage), id. 
art. 5(3), at 11, 7(2) (insurance contracts), id. art. 7(2), at 12, and 8(4) (individual 
employment contracts), id. art. 8(4), at 13. 
 41. Regulation 864/2007, on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual 
Obligations (Rome II), art. 4, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40, 44. 
 42. Id. art. 5, at 44. 
 43. Id. art. 6(2), at 44. 
 44. Id. art. 10, at 45. 
 45. Id. art. 11, at 45. 
 46. Id. art. 12, at 45. 
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with a country other than the one whose law is designated as applicable by the 
above articles, then the law of that country governs.47 The escapes are now 
available in the 27 European Union countries in which Rome I and Rome II 
are in force, whether or not those countries have similar escapes in their own 
codifications.48  
Outside the European Union, escapes similar to those of the Rome 
Convention or Rome I can be found in the Hague Sales Convention49 and the 
codifications of Albania, Argentina, Serbia, Taiwan, and Turkey.50 For torts, 
escapes similar to those of Rome II can be found in the codifications of 
Albania, Macedonia, Japan, Serbia, Taiwan, and Turkey.51 
In the area of successions, specific escapes based on the closer connection 
are found in the E.U. Successions Regulation,52 the Hague Convention on the 
Law Applicable to Estates,53 the Finnish Inheritance Code,54 and the Burkina 
                                                                                                             
 47. See articles cited supra notes 41–46. Articles 4 and 5 state that a 
“manifestly more closely connected” with another country “might” be based on a 
pre-existing relationship between the parties, such as a contract, that is “closely 
connected with the tort/delict in question.” Id. arts. 4, 5, at 40, 44. 
 48. See SYMEONIDES, CODIFYING CHOICE OF LAW, supra note 13, 196 & 
n.153 (2014). 
 49. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods art. 8(3), Dec. 22, 1986, 24 I.L.M. 1575 (1985). 
 50. SYMEONIDES, CODIFYING CHOICE OF LAW, supra note 13, at 196–97 & 
n.155. 
 51. Id. at 197 & n.156.  
 52. Regulation 650/2012, on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition and 
Enforcement of Decisions and Acceptance and Enforcement of Authentic 
Instruments in Matters of Succession and on the Creation of a European 
Certificate of Succession, art. 21, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 107, 120 (providing that, 
unless the decedent had chosen another law (article 22), the succession is 
governed by the law of the state of the decedent’s last habitual residence). 
However, if the decedent was “manifestly more closely connected” with another 
state, the law of the latter state governs. Id. 
 53. Convention on the Law Applicable to the Estates of Deceased Persons 
art. 3, Aug. 1, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 146 (1989) (providing that, “in exceptional 
circumstances,” the principle of the closest connection may lead to the application 
of a law other than the one designated by the Convention). This convention is not 
yet in force. 
 54. See PERINTÖKAARI [INHERITANCE CODE] ch. 26, § 5(3) (Fin.) (providing 
that although the law of the decedent’s nationality governs in certain cases, that 
law will be displaced by the law of another state with which the decedent had “an 
essentially closer connection . . . taking all circumstances into account” (Ministry 
of Justice, Fin., unofficial translation)). 
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Faso codification.55 In other areas, escapes based on the closer connection 
are found in the provisions of the German codification dealing with 
property56 and the provisions of the Polish codification dealing with goods 
in transit.57 The Hague conventions dealing with maintenance58 and the 
protection of children59 and adults60 also employ similar (and indeed more 
                                                                                                             
 55. See CODE DES PERSONNES ET DE LA FAMILLE [CODE OF PERSONS AND 
FAMILY] art. 1043 (Burk. Faso) (providing that the law of the decedent’s last 
domicile displaces the otherwise applicable national law if the decedent had a 
closer connection with the domiciliary state). 
 56. See BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] art. 46 (Juliana 
Mörsdorf-Schulte trans., 2015) (Ger.), https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de 
/englisch_bgbeg/englisch_bgbeg.html [https://perma.cc/5DA7-F9VB] (“If there 
is a substantially closer connection with the law of a country other than that which 
would apply under articles 43 and 45, then that law shall apply.”). 
 57. See Private International Law Act (Feb. 4, 2011), 2011 O.J., no. 80, arts. 
43 (Pol.) (providing that rights in goods in transit are governed by the law of the 
state of dispatch, unless another state has a closer connection, in which case the 
latter law applies). 
 58. See Protocol on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations art. 5, 
Nov. 23, 2007, available at http:// www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions 
.text&cid=133 [https://perma.cc/G4KC-7TMC] (providing that the court may 
deviate from the otherwise applicable law if one of the parties objects and “the 
law of another State, in particular the State of their last common habitual 
residence, has a closer connection with the marriage”). This protocol has been 
ratified by the European Union. See Status Table: Protocol of 23 November 2007 
on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations, HCCH (Sept. 9, 2014), 
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=133 [https://per 
ma.cc/G4KC-7TMC] [hereinafter Status Table]. 
 59. See Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, 
Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and 
Measures for the Protection of Children art. 15(2), Oct. 19, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1391 
(1996) (providing that, “in so far as the protection of the person or the property of 
the child requires,” a court may “exceptionally apply or take into consideration” 
the law of a state other than that of the otherwise applicable law if the other state 
has a “substantial connection” with “the situation”). This convention is in force in 
43 countries. See Status Table, supra note 58. 
 60. See Convention on the International Protection of Adults art. 13(2), Jan. 
13, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 7 (2000) (providing that, “in so far as the protection of the 
person or the property of the adult requires,” a court may “exceptionally apply or 
take into consideration” the law of a state other than that of the otherwise 
applicable law if the other state has a “substantial connection” with “the situation”). 
This convention is in force in eight countries. See Status Table: Convention of 13 
January 2000 on the International Protection of Adults, HCCH (Dec. 8, 2015), 
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=71 
[https://perma.cc/2J4P-KXL5]. 
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malleable) escapes. These escapes authorize courts to deviate from the 
otherwise applicable law and apply the law of another state that has a 
“substantial connection” with the case.  
2. Escapes Based on Other Factors 
Some codifications contain escapes based on factors other than the 
closer connection, and one of them, the Russian, authorizes an exception 
from those of its articles that are based on that factor. Article 1213 of the 
Russian codification provides that contracts that do not contain an effective 
choice-of-law clause are governed by the law of the country with which the 
contract is “most closely connected.”61 The article then provides several 
rules presumptively identifying the most closely connected country.62 Each 
of these rules, however, is accompanied by the phrase “unless it otherwise 
follows from a statute, the terms or the nature of the contract, or the totality 
of the circumstances of the case.”63 
Article 10 of the Slovak PIL codification begins by stating that contracts 
that do not contain an effective choice-of-law clause are governed by the 
law whose application is “in keeping with a reasonable regulation of the 
respective relation,” and then designates that law for various types of 
contracts through seven different paragraphs.64 These paragraphs, however, 
are introduced with the phrases “as a rule” or “generally,” thus allowing 
courts to deviate from those rules in appropriate cases.65 In a similar fashion, 
Article 20 of the Croatian codification introduces 20 rules designating the 
applicable law for various contracts with the phrase “if . . . special 
circumstances of the case do not refer to another law,”66 thus allowing courts 
to deviate from these rules if the circumstances of the case so warrant. 
                                                                                                             
 61. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] 
art. 1213 (Russ.) (Author’s translation). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. art. 1211(1) (emphasis added). Articles 1203, 1213, 1217, and 1222 
contain similar escapes for cases involving, respectively, certain foreign juridical 
persons, immovable property contracts, unilateral juridical acts, and unfair 
competition. Id. arts. 1203, 1213, 1217, 1222. 
 64. Act No. 97 of 4 December 1963 on Private International Law and Rules 
of International Procedure art. 10. (Slovk.). 
 65. Id. (alternative translation). 
 66. Zakon o preuzimanju Zakona o rješavanju sukoba zakona s propisima 
drugih zemalja u određenim odnosima [Act Concerning the Resolution of 
Conflicts of Laws with Provisions of Other States in Certain Matters], N.N. 
[Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia] No. 53/1991, art. 20 (1991) (Croat.). 
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Article 9 of the Dutch codification provides a general, renvoi-type 
escape from its rules to protect certain rights acquired under foreign law. 
Based on the “doctrine of the accomplished fact,” Article 9 provides that 
when a foreign law that is applicable under the choice-of-law rules of an 
involved foreign state attributes certain consequences to a particular fact, a 
Dutch court may attribute the same consequences in deviation from its own 
choice-of-law rules. The Dutch courts may only make this attribution, 
however, if failure to do so would constitute “an unacceptable violation of 
the parties’ legitimate expectations or of legal certainty.”67 
Article 3547 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides an escape from all of 
the codification’s articles dealing with tort conflicts in Articles 3543 through 
3546. Article 3547 provides that the law applicable under these articles shall 
not apply if, “from the totality of the circumstances of an exceptional case,” 
it is “clearly evident”68 under the principles of Article 3542—the general 
article for tort conflicts—that the policies of another state would be “more 
seriously impaired if its law were not applied to the particular issue.”69 In 
that situation, the law of the latter state applies.70 
The Puerto Rico draft code contains several escapes, including one for 
tort conflicts modeled after the Louisiana escape. The escape provides that, 
when the code’s rules for tort conflicts would produce a result “clearly 
contrary to the objectives” of Article 39, which articulates the code’s general 
approach for tort conflicts, the applicable law should be selected under the 
approach of Article 39.71 For contract conflicts, the draft code provides a 
general approach in Article 30, followed by presumptive rules for certain 
types of contracts in Article 31.72 The latter article also provides, however, 
that a party may prevent the application of the law designated by these 
presumptive rules by demonstrating that, with regard to the issue in 
                                                                                                             
 67. BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [BW] bk. 10, art. 9 (Neth.) (Author’s translation).  
 68. The word “clearly” and the tautology it produces (“clearly evident”) was 
inserted at the insistence of legislators who wanted to further tighten the escape.  
 69. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3547 (2015). 
 70. Id. For discussion of the history and meaning of this article by its drafter, 
see Symeon C. Symeonides, Louisiana’s New Law of Choice of Law for Tort 
Conflicts: An Exegesis, 66 TUL. L. REV. 677, 684–96 (1992). For subsequent 
application, see Symeon C. Symeonides, Louisiana Conflicts Law: Two 
“Surprises”, 54 LA. L. REV. 497 (1994). For a critique, see Russel J. Weintraub, 
The Contributions of Symeonides and Kozyris to Making Choice of Law Predictable 
and Just: An Appreciation and Critique, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 511 (1990). 
 71. A BILL FOR THE CODIFICATION OF PUERTO RICAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW art. 39 (2002) [hereinafter PUERTO RICO DRAFT CODIFICATION] (submitted to 
Commisión Conjunta Permanente para la Revisión y Reforma del Código Civil de 
Puerto Rico, by Symeon C. Symeonides on May 25, 2002) (on file with Author). 
 72. Id. arts. 30, 31. 
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question, another state has a “manifestly more significant connection to the 
parties and the transaction in accordance with the principles of Article 30.”73 
The draft code contains additional escape clauses, based on similar or other 
factors, in its titles dealing with domicile,74 marriage,75 matrimonial 
property regimes,76 and child custody.77 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay discusses the role of statutory escape clauses authorizing 
judges to deviate from certain statutory rules. These escapes officially grant 
courts a wide-ranging and, in many cases, open-ended discretion to a degree 
that until recently would have been unthinkable in civil law countries. 
                                                                                                             
 73. Id. art. 31. For discussion by the codification’s drafter, see Symeon C. 
Symeonides, Codifying Choice of Law for Contracts: The Puerto Rico Projet, in 
LAW AND JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR T. 
VON MEHREN 419, 424–34 (James A.R. Nafziger & Symeon C. Symeonides eds., 
2002); Symeon C. Symeonides, Revising Puerto Rico’s Conflicts Law: A Preview, 
28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 413 (1990). 
 74. Article 4(c) provides a general exception from all the code’s rules that 
call for the application of the law of a person’s domicile. The exception provides 
that, when a person’s connection to the state of his domicile is “attenuated” and 
his connections to another state are “significantly stronger and more pertinent to 
the particular issue,” that person may be treated as a domiciliary of the latter state 
for the purposes of that issue, “provided such treatment is appropriate” under the 
principles of the code’s general article (Article 2). PUERTO RICO DRAFT 
CODIFICATION, supra note 71, art. 4(c). 
 75. With regard to marriage, Article 11 provides that the starting point is the 
law of the state of the marriage or the state of the first matrimonial domicile. Id. 
at 11. If the marriage was valid in either of those states, the marriage is considered 
valid, unless it violates a “strong” public policy of the state that, under the general 
article for status, has a “substantially more significant connection” to the parties 
and the dispute. Id. If the marriage was not valid in either of the two states, the 
marriage may nevertheless be considered valid “if it would be so considered in 
another state” that, under the general article, has a “more significant connection” 
to the parties and the dispute. Id. 
 76. For matrimonial regimes, Article 24 provides that if the law applicable 
upon termination of the regime would result in unfairly depriving one spouse of 
protection accorded by the law previously governing the regime, the court may 
make “appropriate exceptions or adjustments in order to accord that spouse 
substantially equivalent protection.” Id. art. 24. 
 77. For child custody cases, Article 20 calls for the application of forum law, 
unless under the general article for issues of status, another state has “a more 
significant connection” to the child and the dispute and the application of the law 
of that state would “serve the best interest of the child.” Id. art. 20. 
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Although covering only one field of law—PIL—this Essay supports some 
general conclusions about the current status of the art and science of 
codification and the evolving relationship between the legislature and the 
judiciary.78  
The art and science of codification and statutory drafting has advanced 
significantly since the time of Montesquieu or, for that matter, the Code 
Napoléon. Despite contrary arguments in common-law countries, 
codification need not petrify the law, nor render it unduly inflexible for 
exceptional cases. Codification does not necessarily outlaw judicial 
discretion. Modern PIL codifications employ various tools such as soft 
connecting factors and escape clauses that inject controlled dosages of 
flexibility, and thus help attain an equilibrium between certainty and 
flexibility.  
To be sure, one may question whether this equilibrium is the “right” one 
in every case. For example, this Author has criticized some of the escape 
clauses discussed here as not providing enough flexibility because they are 
phrased in such a way as to be employable only in the most extreme cases. 
This Author has also criticized the fact that these escapes are phrased not in 
terms of issues and policies, but rather in terms that are either (a) too 
holistic—meaning geared to the whole case rather than to aspects or issues 
of the case, or (b) too geographic—such as the “closer” connection.79 In 
contrast, a German author, while praising the “refinement . . . and 
sophistication” of recent PIL codifications, lamented the losses in certainty 
and foreseeability and warned of the “dangers of . . . over-flexibility.”80  
Certainly, this is a matter on which reasonable minds can differ. Gains 
in flexibility will always produce corresponding losses in certainty, and vice 
versa, and questions will always exist on whether the losses outweigh the 
gains. The quest for the “right” equilibrium between certainty and flexibility 
is as perpetual as the tension Aristotle identified 23 centuries ago. What is 
new, however, is that legislators and judges are no longer antagonists in 
this quest. 
                                                                                                             
 78. As noted earlier, the tension between certainty and flexibility is present 
in all legal fields, although the relative intensity of these needs differs from field 
to field, as does the optimum equilibrium between them.  
 79. See SYMEONIDES, CODIFYING CHOICE OF Law, supra note 13, at 201–04; 
Symeon C. Symeonides, The American Revolution and the European Evolution 
in Choice of Law: Reciprocal Lessons, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1741, 1773–82 (2008). 
 80. Michael Martinek, The Seven Pillars of Wisdom in Private International Law 
– The German and the Swiss Experience with the Codification of Conflicts Law Rules, 
SAARBRÜCKER BIBLIOTHEK (2001), http://archiv.jura.uni-saarland.de/projekte/Bib 
liothek2/text.php?id=221 [perma.cc/JQ88-FN4H]. 
